Criminal Law–Searches and Seizures–Individualized Probable Cause Is Necessary to Search Persons Incidentally on Premises Subject to a Warrant Authorized Search by Fuller, Robert J.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 5 
1981 
Criminal Law–Searches and Seizures–Individualized Probable 
Cause Is Necessary to Search Persons Incidentally on Premises 
Subject to a Warrant Authorized Search 
Robert J. Fuller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Fuller, Criminal Law–Searches and Seizures–Individualized Probable Cause Is Necessary to 
Search Persons Incidentally on Premises Subject to a Warrant Authorized Search, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 115 (1981). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INDIVIDUALIZED
PROBABLE CAUSE Is NECESSARY To SEARCH PERSONS INCIDEN-
TALLY ON PREMISES SUBJECTED To A WARRANT AUTHORIZED
SEARCH. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
A valid search warrant, issued by a judge of an Illinois circuit
court, authorized a search of the Aurora Tap Tavern and of the per-
son of the bartender for narcotics and related paraphenalia. In the
process of executing the warrant, the police frisked each of the
twelve customers present, including appellant Ybarra. While frisk-
ing Ybarra, an officer felt what he described as a "cigarette pack
with objects in it." The pack was not removed from Ybarra's pocket
until all of the customers were frisked. The officer then returned to
Ybarra, looked inside the cigarette pack, and found six tinfoil pack-
ets containing heroin.
Ybarra was indicted by a grand jury for possession of a con-
trolled substance. His motion to suppress the heroin was denied on
the basis of an Illinois statute which authorizes the search of persons
found on premises described in a search warrant when the person
executing the warrant has a reasonable suspicion of (1) an impend-
ing assault or (2) destruction or concealment of items described in
the warrant.'
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed Ybarra's conviction
and the denial of his motion to suppress the heroin.2 The court
found that the statute was not unconstitutional in its application to
the facts of this case because the complaint for the warrant indicated
that heroin was being sold or dispensed in the tavern, and therefore,
the patrons were implicated in the heroin traffic and had opportu-
nity to conceal heroin when the warrant was executed.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra's petition for leave
to appeal and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.4
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 108-9 (Smith-Hurd 1980), provides in full:
In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably
detain to search any person in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles, or
things particularly described in the warrant.
2. People v. Ybarra, 58 InI. App. 3d 57, 373 N.E.2d 1013 (1978).
3. Id at 1016-17.
4. Ybarra v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 970 (1979).
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The Court held that the search of Ybarra contravened the fourth
and fourteenth amendments because the officer had neither proba-
ble cause to believe that Ybarra was concealing contraband nor rea-
sonable suspicion that Ybarra was armed and dangerous. Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
The traditional standard for searches is probable cause to be-
lieve that seizable items are in a particular place.5 Warrants are
usually required;6 however, the criterion for determining probable
cause for a warrant may vary with the type of search involved.7
Warrants must specify the place to be searched and the person or
property to be seized.8 Moreover, police may not seize one thing
under the authority of a warrant describing another item.9
The general warrant requirement is subject to several specific
exceptions. A warrant is not required for a search incident to an
arrest, l° a search conducted during hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,"
or a search of a movable vehicle where probable cause exists to be-
lieve that the vehicle contains contraband or instrumentalities of a
crime.'2 Nor is a warrant required to seize obvious contraband in
plain view of an officer who has an independent right to be in a
position to make the physical seizure.' 3 A warrantless entry of
premises to render apparently necessary emergency assistance is
permissible,' 4 as is a warrantless search where consent is freely
5. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
6. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
9. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
10. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
11. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
12. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
13. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968).





In certain situations where the need to search outweighs the se-
verity of the intrusion, limited searches may be permitted when rea-
sonable suspicion exists, but probable cause does not.16 A frisk (pat
down of outer clothing to detect weapons), for example, is one type
of limited search which may be conducted without probable cause
to believe that the person frisked presently possesses seizable
items. 7 As a prerequisite to a frisk, the officer must have an articul-
able suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to justify a stop (brief
detention).18 A reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is pres-
ently armed and dangerous is then sufficient justification for a
frisk. 19 The frisk exception to the traditional probable cause stan-
dard has been narrowly construed to require individualized suspi-
cion,20 and mere proximity to others independently suspected of
crime is not an acceptable basis for a frisk.2'
Prior to Ybarra, the United States Supreme Court had not de-
lineated the effect, if any, that a person's presence at the site of a
warrant authorized search has on the quantum of individualized
suspicion necessary to justify a frisk or a full search of that person.
In jurisdictions without statutes which authorize searches of such
persons, courts have usually held that if the person is not named in
the warrant, a search of that person violates the fourth amend-
ment.22 Individualized probable cause is usually necessary to search
anyone incidentally on the premises, 23 and individualized suspicion
15. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968).
16. For example, limited suspicion searches may be conducted in close proximity to
international borders. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States
v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
17. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring).
19. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
20. Dunnaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979). See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
21. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
22. Poole v. State, 247 So. 2d 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho
281, 193 P. 79 (1920); Salmon v. State, 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967); State v. Fox,
283 Minn. 176, 168 N.W.2d 260 (1969); State v. Bradbury, 109 N.H. 105, 243 A.2d 302
(1968); State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S.E. 514 (1923); State v. Wrest, 190 Wis. 251, 208
N.W. 899 (1926); State v. Jokosh, 181 Wis. 160, 193 N.W. 976 (1923). Contra, Colding v.
State, 259 Ark. 634, 536 S.W.2d 106 (1976); Samuel v. State, 222 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1969); State v.
De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972).
23. United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960); State v. Nabarra, 55 Ha-
waii 583, 525 P.2d 573 (1974); State v. Carufel, 106 R.I. 739, 263 A.2d 686 (1970).
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is usually required to justify a frisk during a warrant authorized
search.24
In contrast Arizona, 25 the District of Columbia, 26 Georgia, 27 Il-
linois,28 and Kansas29 have adopted virtually identical statutes
which authorize the search of anyone present when a search warrant
is executed if the police feel it necessary for self-protection or to
prevent concealment or destruction of items described in the war-
rant. These statutes have been liberally construed to apply to any-
one "reasonably connected to the premises. ' 30 Persons entering the
premises during the warrant authorized search may be searched,
31
but those arriving after the search is completed may not.32 Any
search of a person not named in the warrant must be conducted as
soon as possible; the police may not wait and then search later.33
The five state statutes have expanded the scope of search war-
rants to include persons not named therein on the basis of two exi-
gencies which the United States Supreme Court has recognized as
justifying exceptions to the usual requirement that a person
24. United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976).
25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3916(E) (1978).
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2 3 -524(g) (1973).
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (1978).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, $ 108-9 (Smith-Hurd 1980). See note 1 supra for full
text.
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2509 (1974).
30. State v. Saiz, 106 Ariz. 352, 476 P.2d 515 (1970); United States v. Graves, 315 A.2d
559 (D.C. 1974); United States v. Miller, 298 A.2d 34 (D.C. 1972); State v. Shope, 147 Ga.
App. 119, 248 S.E.2d 188 (1978); Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970);
People v. Dukes, 48 Ill. App. 3d 237, 363 N.E.2d 62 (1977); People v. Kielczynski, 130 IU.
App. 2d 231, 264 N.E.2d 767 (1970); People v. Pugh, 69 I11. App. 2d 312, 217 N.E.2d 577
(1966); Kansas v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d 1174 (1972).
These statutes have even been applied to anyone who happens to be standing in the
curtilage of the premises to be searched. State v. McClellan, 215 Kan. 81, 523 P.2d 357
(1974); cf. People v. Easterbrook, 43 A.D.2d 719, 350 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1973), aft'd, 35 N.Y.2d
913, 324 N.E.2d 367, 364 N.Y.S.2d 899, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1974) (persons searched
were leaving apartment building where police were about to execute warrant explicitly au-
thorizing search of anyone found on premises of a particular apartment).
31. People v. Campbell, 67 I11. App. 3d 745, 385 N.E.2d 168 (1979); People v. Pugh, 69
Ill. App. 2d 312, 217 N.E.2d 557 (1966). Contra, Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 129, 227
S.E.2d 911 (1976); Wallace v. State, 131 Ga. App. 204, 205 S.E.2d 523 (1974). See also
Smith v. State, 292 Ala. 120, 289 So. 2d 816 (1974); People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 698, 234
N.E.2d 460, 287 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1971).
32. People v. Miller, 74 Ill. App. 3d 177, 392 N.E.2d 271 (1979).
33. People v. One Cadillac Automobile VIN #J8316714, 4 Ill. App. 3d 780, 281 N.E.2d
776 (1972).
The scope of the search may extend to objects closely identified with the person, such as
a purse, but not to visitors' luggage. State v. Shope, 147 Ga. App. 119, 248 S.E.2d 188
(1978); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360 (1977). See also Commonwealth v.
Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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searched be named in a search warrant: (1) reasonable suspicion
that the person is presently armed and dangerous, which would jus-
tify a frisk for weapons,34 and (2) likelihood that important evidence
will be destroyed in the absence of an immediate search. 35  These
statutes, however, have extended these exigency exceptions to au-
thorize searches of persons present during a warrant authorized
search without the usual threshold of individualized reasonable sus-
picion or individualized probable cause.
36
In refusing to approve such an extension of the exigency excep-
tions in the present case, the United States Supreme Court noted
that a search of all patrons of a large retail or commercial establish-
ment would be obviously violative of the fourth amendment. 37 The
Court then examined the issue of whether or not the officers had
probable cause to search Ybarra. The Court pointed out that the
complaint on which the warrant was based did not allege that the
patrons of the tavern were involved in the heroin traffic. Moreover
the Court emphasized that Ybarra himself did not exhibit suspicious
behavior such as words, movements, or gestures which might indi-
cate an attempt to conceal contraband when the officers entered the
tavern.38
The Court cited Sibron v. New York,39 Katz v. United States,'
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
35. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
36. An alternative approach is taken by Massachusetts and New York statutes which
allow warrants to explicitly authorize the search of premises and any person present "who
may be found to have" the items sought in the warrant in his possession. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 276, § 2A (1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.15(2) (1971). See Commonwealth
v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 348 N.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976); People v. Easter-
brook, 43 A.D.2d 719, 350 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1973), aft'd, 35 N.Y.2d 913, 324 N.E.2d 367, 364
N.Y.S.2d 899, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1974).
In states without such statutory authorization, the above language is generally held to
be unconstitutionally broad. State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v.
Riggins, 138 N.J. Super. 497, 351 A.2d 406 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Garrett v. State, 270
P.2d 1101 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); Crossland v. State, 266 P.2d 649 (Okla. Crim. App.
1954).
A North Carolina statute takes the unique approach of allowing police to detain per-
sons present on premises until the warrant authorized search is completed, then, if the items
described in the warrant have not been found, the police may search those persons, but no
evidence of a different type than that described in the warrant may be seized or used as a
basis for prosecution of any person so searched. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-256 (1978). See
State v. Long, 37 N.C. App. 622, 246 S.E.2d 846 (1978); State v. Watlington, 30 N.C. App.
101, 226 S.E.2d 186, appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 666, 228 S.E.2d 457 (1976).
37. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 89.
38. Id at.90-91.
39. 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968).
40. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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and Rakas v. Illinois4 for the proposition that probable cause to
search must be individualized because (1) the fourth and fourteenth
amendments protect the privacy of persons, not places, and (2) mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of a crime does not
by itself create probable cause to search.42 The Court concluded
that despite the existence of the search warrant and the Illinois stat-
ute4 3 the police did not have the requisite probable cause to search
Ybarra.4
In contrast, Rehnquist's dissent denied that individualized
probable cause was necessary to search Ybarra. While the fourth
amendment requires probable cause for a search warrant to be is-
sued, this requirement had been met with respect to the tavern and
thus, according to Rehnquist, the justification for extending the
scope of the search to the patrons should be judged by balancing the
need to search against the severity of the intrusion.45 Rehnquist ar-
gued that the fourth amendment required warrants to specify only
the places to be searched, not the people, and that it was impractical
to require that warrants name in advance every person whom the
police might need to search.46 Rehnquist also noted that if individu-
alized probable cause to search Ybarra for heroin had existed, the
warrant would have been irrelevant because Ybarra could have
been arrested and fully searched incident to that arrest.47
The Court next examined the possible justification of the frisk
of Ybarra within the suspicion rationale of Terry v. Ohio .48 The
Court stressed that the Terry exception is narrowly defined to re-
quire individualized reasonable suspicion that the suspect is pres-
ently armed and dangerous, and that Terry does not authorize a
generalized search for weapons or a search for anything but weap-
ons even at the site of a warrant authorized search. 49 The Court
concluded that a weapons frisk of Ybarra was not justified because
the police had no knowledge of any prior criminal history of Ybarra
and no particular reason to believe that he was either armed or dan-
41. 439 U.S. 128, 138-43, 148-49 (1978).
42. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 91.
43. See note 1 supra.
44. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 91-92.
45. Id at 105.
46. Id at 102.
47. Id at 105.
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see text accompanying note 19 supra.




In contrast, Rehnquist argued that the warrant coupled with the
situation made the frisk a reasonable extension of Terry because
(1) the warrant provided the element of detached deliberation not
present in a warrantless street stop and frisk, (2) the peril of the
police was greater in the tavern than in a routine street stop because
of prolonged proximity and distraction while searching the tavern,
and (3) it was reasonable for police to assume that because heroin
* sales were taking place at the tavern, patrons were involved in the
illegal transactions." Rehnquist claimed that narcotics dealers are
usually armed, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of danger from
anyone slightly suspected of trafficking in drugs. 2 The essence of
Terry was described by Rehnquist as a recognition of the need for
flexible rules in situations like that present in Ybarra."
The Court finally examined the State's argument that evidence
searches of persons present at "compact" premises subject to a
search warrant are constitutional when the police have a "reason-
able belief' that such persons may be connected with those premises
or may conceal or destroy contraband. 4 The Court cited United
States v. Di Re 55 in holding that such an evidence search must be
supported by individualized probable cause. 6
The Court did not specifically hold the Illinois statute57 to be
unconstitutionalper se, but held that it could not be constitutionally
applied to the present case." Thus, the most direct impact of
50. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 92-93. Because the Court found that the frisk was
unreasonable, it did not reach the issues of whether or not the frisk yielded probable cause to
believe that Ybarra was carrying narcotics and whether or not this probable cause constitu-
tionally supported the second search.
51. Id at 106-07.
52. Id at 106.
53. Id at 105. The dissenting opinions of both Burger and Rehnquist criticized the
exclusionary rule and advanced policy arguments for broad support of narcotics searches.
Id at 97-110.
54. Id at 94. Chief Justice Burger states in his dissent: "[Police] are not required to
assume that they will not be harmed by patrons of the kind of establishment shown here,
something quite different from a ballroom at the Waldorf." Id at 97. This comment may
be construed to be either an indirect reference to the state's compact premises theory or a
statement that the Chief Justice believes that a search is constitutionally more reasonable in
a lower class setting.
55. 332 U.S. 581, 583-87 (1948).
56. The Court conceded that Di Re involved a warrantless search and was therefore
not completely controlling, but found that the guiding principle of Di Re applied to the
present case. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 95.
57. See note 1 supra.
58. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 98 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Ybarra will be curtailment of the previously liberal construction of
similar statutes. 9 In states with such statutes, individualized proba-
ble cause must now be shown to justify evidence searches of persons
not named in search warrants who are present when the warrants
are executed.60 Likewise, individualized reasonable suspicion must
now be shown to justify frisks for weapons in the same situations.
Police may avoid much of the impact of Ybarra by focusing on
the elements of suspicion detailed in the majority opinion.61 Police
may become highly sensitized to gestures, movements, words, or
prior criminal history which may be construed as suspicious. The
language of Ybarra provides much room for flexibility in this regard
because each of the elements which the Court noted was lacking in
Ybarra, may if present in future cases, arguably provide grounds for
distinguishing Ybarra. Moreover, Ybarra may influence magis-
trates to more closely examine complaints for search warrants to
find probable cause for including more names on the warrant.62
It might be argued that police will be endangered by the prohi-
bition of routine frisks of all occupants of compact premises sub-
jected to a warrant authorized search. Police, however, have the
option of allowing or asking all persons present but not named in
the warrant to either leave or wait outside while the search is con-
ducted. Prolonged proximity to such persons could thereby be
avoided and police could safely direct their full attention to the
search of the premises.63 Moreover, if police have a reasonable sus-
picion that a particular person is presently armed and dangerous,
Ybarra does not bar a frisk for weapons.64
It is also arguable that Ybarra will shield significant amounts of
contraband from the reach of search warrants. If the police have
probable cause to believe that a particular individual is concealing
contraband, however, they also have probable cause to arrest and
may conduct a full search incident to that arrest. Moreover, police
59. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
60. Whether Ybarra will prohibit the North Carolina approach, see note 36 supra, is
unclear. A tentative conclusion is that the fact that a warrant authorized search did not
uncover the evidence it sought would not of itself give rise to probable cause to believe that
the individual(s) present are concealing contraband on their persons.
61. See text accompanying notes 38, 50 supra.
62. Whether Ybarra will prohibit the Massachusetts and New York approaches, see
note 36 supra, of having warrants explicitly authorize the search of anyone present who
might be armed or concealing contraband, is unclear. However, Ybarra does provide sup-
port for attacking such warrants as being unconstitutionally broad.
63. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
64. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
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usually arrive unexpectedly. Thus, the chance is remote that in an-
ticipation of the search large amounts of contraband will be con-
cealed on the persons of those present but not named in the warrant.
In the final analysis, if police do not have probable cause to believe
that a particular individual is concealing contraband, the risk that a
small amount of contraband may evade the search does not reason-
ably justify the personal humiliation and invasion of privacy of any-
one who happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Robert J Fuller

